Nu het transcript van de Dover-trial, dag 11, waarvan ik eerder de
link had gegeven:
Eerst gaat het over de bredere definitie die Behe van wetenschap hanteert, breder dan de definitie van de NAS (Amerikaanse National Academy of sciences):
transcript schreef:Q In any event, in your expert report, and in your testimony over the last two days, you used a looser definition of "theory," correct?
A I think I used a broader definition, which is more reflective of how the word is actually used in the scientific community.
Q But the way you define scientific theory, you said it's just based on your own experience; it's not a dictionary definition, it's not one issued by a scientific organization.
A It is based on my experience of how the word is used in the scientific community.
Q And as you said, your definition is a lot broader than the NAS definition?
A That's right, intentionally broader to encompass the way that the word is used in the scientific community.
Q Sweeps in a lot more propositions.
A It recognizes that the word is used a lot more broadly than the National Academy of Sciences defined it.
Q In fact, your definition of scientific theory is synonymous with hypothesis, correct?
A Partly -- it can be synonymous with hypothesis, it can also include the National Academy's definition. But in fact, the scientific community uses the word "theory" in many times as synonymous with the word "hypothesis," other times it uses the word as a synonym for the definition reached by the National Academy, and at other times it uses it in other ways.
Q But the way you are using it is synonymous with the definition of hypothesis?
A No, I would disagree. It can be used to cover hypotheses, but it can also include ideas that are in fact well substantiated and so on. So while it does include ideas that are synonymous or in fact are hypotheses, it also includes stronger senses of that term.
Dit gebruik komt overeen met zoals Popper in het boek van De Vries wordt weergegeven:
Wetenschappelijke theorieën zijn dus per definitie feilbaar, zij hebben een hypothetisch karakter: zij drukken een vermoeden uit. In plaats van het woord theorie kunnen we dus ook steeds 'hypothese' gebruiken, al zullen we in het algemeen het gewone spraakgebruik op dit punt volgen en onder een theorie een samenstel van hypotheses verstaan.
transcript schreef:Q And using your definition, intelligent design is a scientific theory, correct?
A Yes.
Q Under that same definition astrology is a scientific theory under your definition, correct?
A Under my definition, a scientific theory is a proposed explanation which focuses or points to physical, observable data and logical inferences. There are many things throughout the history of science which we now think to be incorrect which nonetheless would fit that -- which would fit that definition. Yes, astrology is in fact one, and so is the ether theory of the propagation of light, and many other -- many other theories as well.
Q The ether theory of light has been discarded, correct?
A That is correct.
Q But you are clear, under your definition, the definition that sweeps in intelligent design, astrology is also a scientific theory, correct?
A Yes, that's correct. And let me explain under my definition of the word "theory," it is -- a sense of the word "theory" does not include the theory being true, it means a proposition based on physical evidence to explain some facts by logical inferences. There have been many theories throughout the history of science which looked good at the time which further progress has shown to be incorrect. Nonetheless, we can't go back and say that because they were incorrect they were not theories. So many many things that we now realized to be incorrect, incorrect theories, are nonetheless theories.
Q Has there ever been a time when astrology has been accepted as a correct or valid scientific theory, Professor Behe?
A Well, I am not a historian of science. And certainly nobody -- well, not nobody, but certainly the educated community has not accepted astrology as a science for a long long time. But if you go back, you know, Middle Ages and before that, when people were struggling to describe the natural world, some people might indeed think that it is not a priori -- a priori ruled out that what we -- that motions in the earth could affect things on the earth, or motions in the sky could affect things on the earth.
Ook dit valt m.i. binnen Poppers wetenschapsdefinitie. Hoewel Popper met name ook de astrologie op het oog had bij het opstellen van zijn falsificatiecriterium, kan je het ook als voortgang van de wetenschap beschouwen dat astrologie vandaag de dag niet tot de wetenschap behoort, omdat er nu een criterium is dat een duidelijk onderscheid aanbrengt, een criterium dat er vroeger niet was. Want:
het onderscheidende kenmerk van wetenschap is niet dat zij in tegenstelling tot andere vormen van kennis 'op ervaring berust', maar dat zij kan worden verbeterd.
Ik zal de komende tijd wat gaan inlezen over de NAS, de NCSE en hoe de filosofie van de nieuwe wereld zich verhoudt tot die van de oude. Mogelijk gaat het terug op verschillen tussen analytische en continentale filosofie.
